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CLASS CERTIFICATION IN STATE COURT
WELFARE LITIGATION: A REQUEST FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
DAAN BRAVEMAN

*

INTRODUCTION

eginald Heber Smith observed in his treatise on injustice and
• inequality that the denial of justice to the poor is not attributable to the substantive law, which, "with minor exceptions, is
eminently fair and impartial." 1 Rather the denial of justice is due
to "grave defects in the administration of the law." 2 As Smith
stated in 1919:
There is something tragic in the fact that a plan and method of
administering justice, honestly designed to make efficient and
certain that litigation on which at last all rights depend, should
result in rearing insuperable obstacles in the path of those who
most need protection, so that litigation becomes impossible, rights
are lost, and wrongs go unredressed. 3

Whatever the continuing accuracy of Smith's suggestion that
the substantive law is fair and impartial,4 it is manifest that his observations of the defects in the administration of the law retain
their original validity. The recent experience of welfare recipients
in New York is evidence that little has changed in this regard in
the past sixty years. The courts continue to place serious obstacles
in the path of those who most need judicial protection. The specific evidence that serves as a basis for this perhaps harsh indictment of the New York judiciary is found in those decisions denying
welfare litigants the opportunity to use the state's newly promulgated class action rule.5 The New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that class certification is unnecessary, and therefore
class action relief is inapplicable to welfare litigation because the
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B. 1969, University of Rochester; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania. I wish to express my special thanks
to Barbara Lake for her research assistance, and to Rene Reixach for his helpful comments.
1.

R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 15 (1919).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See E.

JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFoRM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE

280 (1974).
5. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976).
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doctrine of stare decisis adequately protects nonparty welfare recipients.8 Unfortunately, stare decisis has been an inadequate substitute for class certification, and reliance on that doctrine has prevented fulfillment of substantive welfare policy. As a result of the
method of administering justice adopted by the New York courts,
the rights of welfare recipients have been lost, and actionable
wrongs remain uncorrected.
The purpose of this article is to examine New York courts'
reliance on the stare decisis doctrine, and to explore the need for
class certification in state court welfare litigation.7 It is argued
6. Schimmel v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976), a0'g
50 A.D.2d 1085, 377 N.Y.S.2d 313 (4th Dep't 1975); Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357
N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976); Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382
N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Baumes v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 296, 342 N.E.2d 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d 760
(1975); Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975). The doctrine of stare decisis "makes the common law what it is by giving judicial precedents the
effect of law.... [Stare decisis] set[s] precedents for cases generally." D. SIEGEL, NE.W
YORK PRACTICE § 449 (1978).
The court's reliance on the stare decisis doctrine in lieu of class certification applies
generally to actions against public officials. See, e.g., Rubin v. Levine, 41 N.Y.2d 1024, 363
N.E.2d 1375, 395 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1977); Rivera v. Trimarco, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 NE.2d 661,
368 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1975). The impact of that determination, however, has been primarily on
welfare cases. While New York courts have consistently refused to apply class action procedures to welfare cases, they have shown an increasing willingness to allow class action
status in cases against nonwelfare, governmental officials. See, e.g., Knapp v. Michaux, 55
A.D.2d 1025, 1026, 391 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (4th Dep't 1977); Ammon v. Suffolk County, 90
Misc. 2d 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
7. It is necessary to define the terms used throughout this article. The term welfare
refers to public assistance provided by federal and state direct cash transfer and income.
in-kind programs. At the federal level, the major cash transfer programs are the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (1976), and
the Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled (S.S.I.) program, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976). The A.F.D.C. program was established by the Social Security
Act to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives
with whom they reside, thereby "encouraging the care of dependent children in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). The program is financed by
both federal and matching state funds but is administered by the states. King v. Smith,
392 US. 309, 316 (1968). Under a "scheme of cooperative federalism," states are not required to participate in A.F.D.C.; however, those that do participate must adopt and implement a plan consistent with the federal statutory provisions. Id. See generally B. BRUDNO,
PovERTY, INEQUALITY AND THE LAW 579-784 (1976); Lupu, Welfare and Federalism:A.F.D.C.
Eligibility Policies and the Scope of State Discretion, 57 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1977).
The S.S.I. program, which is the other major federal cash transfer program, provides
income for aged, blind and disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976). Unlike A.F.D.C., it
is primarily financed and administered by the federal government. See B. BRUDNO, supra at
518-19; Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 880-81 (1974).
The federal income-in-kind programs provide services, rather than cash, to eligible
recipients. The two major federal income-in-kind programs are the Food Stamp program,
7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2027 (1976), and the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976).
See B. BRUDNO, supra at 519-20.
In addition to these federal programs, public assistance is available under state financed
and administered programs. New York, for example, has established the Home Relief Pro-
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that the class action rule performs an essential and instrumental
role in transforming substantive welfare rights into actual benefits
for welfare recipients. Equally important, it is suggested that application of the class action rule to welfare litigants has intrinsic
as well as instrumental value, serving as a judicial statement that
welfare recipients are entitled to the same respect afforded litigants
enforcing traditional property rights.
Clearly, "few procedural devices have been the subject of
more widespread criticism and more sustained attack-and equally
spirited defense-[than the class action rule]." 8 When used by
legal services attorneys 9 on behalf of the poor, the class action procedure has been characterized as a device that promotes "leftistsocialist causes." 10 The views of former Vice President Agnew, a
frequent critic of the class action and law reform litigation by legal
services lawyers,'1 have been warmly received by a presiding justice of one of New York's intermediate appellate courts. In a letter
to the former Vice President, he stated:
In my judicial capacity as Presiding Justice of the Appellate
Division, Third Department, which comprises tventy-eight counties
in the State of New York, I have come to look upon the Office of
Economic Opportunity Legal Programs as the creation of another
bureaucracy not interested in the complaint of individual litigants,
but more interested in bringing class actions for the purpose of
gram, which provides cash assistance to those ineligible under the federal programs. N.Y.
Soc. SERv. LAiW §§ 157-166 (McKinney 1976).
The term welfare litigation refers to cases in which the challenging party asserts that
(1) a state welfare statute, regulation or practice is inconsistent with federal law and there-

fore is preempted under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, (2) a state or federal welfare statute, regulation or practice is unconstitutional under the state or federal
constitutions, or (3) a state regulation or practice is not authorized by the state statute.
The focus of this article is not on litigation contending that a valid state statute or regulation has been improperly applied in a specific instance. Such a claim can be resolved
through an administrative fair hearing process, see note 109 infra, or by an individual
lawsuit.
8. American Bar Association, Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force,
74 F.R.D. 159, 194 (1976). See generally Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 -ARv.

L. REv. 1818 (1976).
9. The phrase legal services attorneys refers to lawyers employed under the previous
Legal Services program, Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222,
§ 222 (a) (8), 81 Stat. 672 (repealed 1974), or the present Legal Services Corporation Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976). These attorneys provide free legal assistance to individuals
who othenvise would be unable to afford counsel. See generally E. JOHNSON, supra note 4;
George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL. L. REv. 681 (1976);
Note, Legal Services-Past and Present, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 960 (1974).
10. H.R. No. 247, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEvs 8872, 8894 (minority view of Rep. Landgrebe).
11.

Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program,58 A.B.A.J. 980 (1972).
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trying to change not only the legal but the social approach in all

sorts 12
of problems, many of which have little, if any, strictly legal
basis.

Despite criticism, class action suits have been successfully maintained on behalf of indigent clients, particularly those challenging
the validity of state welfare statutes and regulations.8
Until recently, class action welfare litigation was concentrated
in the federal courts; 14 however, the welfare recipient, like other
classes of litigants, has fallen victim to the Burger Court decisions
that "bar the federal court house door to litigants with substantial
federal claims." 15 For the welfare recipient, this occurred when the
Supreme Court determined that the eleventh amendment prevented a federal court from directing state officials to make retroactive payment of wrongfully-withheld welfare benefits.' 0 While
this decision does not completely bar access,' 7 it severely limits the
scope of the remedy available to the welfare recipient in federal
court.
12. Letter from the Honorable J. Clarence Herlihy to Vice President Spiro T. Agnew,
dated Oct. 12, 1972. Attached as exhibit 3 to the affidavit of Sylvia D. Garland, sworn to
on Nov. 15, 1972, and submitted in Alberghini v. Gurda, No. 72-3487 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). (A
copy of this letter is in the author's files.) See also Janowitz & Stumpf, Judges and the
Poor: Bench Responses to FederallyFinanced Legal Services, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1058, 1074-75
(1969).
In contrast to the critics, a report to Congress by the Comptroller General of the
United States recommended greater utilization of class actions by legal services attorneys
to achieve law reforms. COMPROLLER GENERAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM-ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AND PROBLEMS FACED BY ITS GRANTEES 14-18 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 US. 282 (1971); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
US. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
14. For instance, see cases cited in note 13 supra.
15. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 345 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv.
489 (1977); Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal
Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 841 (1977);
Comment, ProtectingFundamentalRights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal
Hole, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 63 (1977).
16. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
17. The decision does not prevent the federal court from directing prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 667-68. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
18. Arguably, the optimal relief for the welfare litigant would include recovery of
wrongfully withheld benefits for all aggrieved individuals, as well as a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the practice in the future. See Note, The Outlook for
Welfare Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60
COmELL L. REv. 897, 904 n.40 (1975). Thus, the decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), prohibits the federal courts from directing an important aspect of the optimal
relief-that of retroactive benefits. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
The impact of Edelman might be reduced if a federal court declared a state welfare
practice invalid, and ordered state officials to notify aggrieved recipients that the state ad-
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As a result, welfare recipients were forced to reexamine the
state court as the forum in which to resolve their claims. Mr. Justice Brennan observed that "the very premise of the cases that
foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts
to step into the breach.... With federal scrutiny diminished, state

courts must respond by increasing their own." 19 Unfortunately
for welfare recipients in New York, state courts may have betrayed
the trust placed in them by the Supreme Court; they have erected
a state barrier to effective class action welfare litigation.
I.

EMERGENCE OF STARE DEcISIS AS A

SUBSTITUTE FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

In two recent articles, 20 Professor Adolf Homburger thor-

oughly examined the history of the class action procedure in New
York. There is no need to retrace that history here. It is sufficient
to note that New York retained the ancient Field Code version of
the class action rule, which, as Professor Homburger stated, "may
well qualify as one of the worst [provisions] in the Code." 21 Class
certification was authorized only where there existed a question of
"a common or general interest," 22 a phrase that was interpreted
ministrative procedure is available to recover improperly denied benefits. Any liability
would thus be imposed by the state, not the federal court. See Quern v. Jordan, 47 U.S.L.W.
4241 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1979). But see Fanty v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 551 F.2d 2
(3d Cir. 1977).
An alternative strategy might be successful. Welfare litigants challenging a state welfare practice might request the federal court to grant declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as retroactive benefits. Because of Edelman, the court would necessarily conclude that
it lacked jurisdiction to order the state to pay such benefits. If, however, plaintiffs were
successful on their other claims, they could then file a claim in a state court requesting
retroactive benefits and argue that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the merits. The
only remaining issue in dispute would be the amount of the monetary award. Cf. Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 47 U.S.L.W. 4079 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (offensive use of collateral
estoppel effective if the party against whom it is being applied had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims in the earlier action).
Suggestions for circumventing Edelman, see, e.g., Note, supra at 908-17, cannot guarantee favorable results for the welfare litigant. Perhaps the only direct recourse remaining
is a state court class action seeking the optimal relief: an injunction and a judgment for
class-wide retroactive benefits. The effectiveness of this lawsuit would depend, in part, on
the willingness of state courts to order class-wide relief.
19. Brennan, supranote 15, at 503.
20. Homburger, The 1975 New York Judicial Conference Package: Class Actions and
ComparativeNegligence, 25 BUFFALo L. Rav. 415 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Conference Package]; Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUaS. L. REV.
609 (1971) [hereinafter cited as State Class Actions].
21. State Class Actions, supra note 20, at 613.
22. Law of April 4, 1962, ch. 318, § 4, 1962 N.Y. Laws 2086 (formerly N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAw § 1005 (a)) (repealed 1975).
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as requiring privity among the potential class members.23 While
the feudal concept of privity "defies definition and analysis," 2 it
suggests "that there is a jural relation of one sort or another between the parties." 25 Professor Homburger explained that the difficulty with the Field Code class action provision and its judicially
imposed privity requirement was that it "failed to respond to an
overwhelming social need for a workable collective remedy in situations where there is no consensual relationship between the dispersed, unorganized and unrelated members of a class." 20
In the early 1970's, the New York Court of Appeals began to
urge legislative repeal of the class action provision. Judge Jasen,
writing for the court in 1973, underscored the need for "a more
liberal procedure." 27 He stated that "[i]n our view there is urgency for early legislation ... in light of the general and judicial
dissatisfaction with the existing restrictions on class action which
in many instances may mean a total lack of remedy, as a practical
matter, for wrongs demanding correction." 28
Two years later, the legislature responded by replacing the
old class action rule with article 9 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules,2 9 modeled on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Governor of New York observed that repeal of the
anachronistic class action rule represented a "historic advance for
the people of New York," 80 and would reverse the 125-year trend
of "needlessly restricting meaningful access to state courts for
countless people." 31 By allowing common questions of law or fact
to be litigated in a single forum, the Governor believed "the bill
would result in greater conservation of judicial effort." 2
There was optimism by those representing welfare litigants.
Edelman v. Jordan 3 had been decided in the previous year, and
appeared to foreclose effective recourse to the federal courts."
23. Judicial Conference Package,supra note 20, at 421-22.

24. Id. at 422.
25. State Class Actions, supranote 20, at 615.
26. Judicial Conference Package,supra note 20, at 422.

27. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558, 352
N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973).
28.

Id.

LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976).
30. GovaER.OR'S IMiL.VO ANDUM, June 17, 1975, Civil Practice-Class Action, 1975 N.Y.

29. N.Y. Civ. Piot.

Laws 1743 (McKinney).
31. Id.

52. Id.
33. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
34. See Note, supra note 18, at 903-08.
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Welfare litigants required a state court procedural mechanism that
would enable them to obtain effective group relief. Article 9 appeared to provide the requisite mechanism for converting legal
rights into effective class-wide remedies. Indeed, Professor Homburger, principal draftsman of the new rule, stated that article 9
had the potential for stimulating increased state judicial receptivity to both group remedies and public interest litigation. 35
For welfare recipients, such optimism was short-lived. The
New York Court of Appeals has steadfastly adhered to its prearticle 9 view that class designation is inappropriate in welfare
cases because governmental operations are involved, and that future litigants will be adequately protected by the principles of
stare decisis. That judicially created notion was initially advanced
in Rivera v. Trimarco,36 a nonwelfare case decided six months before the effective date of article 9.37 Petitioners in Rivera instituted
proceedings against judges of the Civil Court of New York City.
They claimed they were entitled to a manual stenographic record,
rather than a mechanically recorded record, of hearings in the
Housing Part of Civil Court 5 The court of appeals dismissed the
appeal. In dicta, the court concluded that the lower court erred
in granting class certification:
[I]t was an abuse of discretion on the part of the courts below to
grant class relief since in the circumstances here presented, governmental operations being involved, on the granting of any relief to
the petitioners comparable relief would adequately flow to others
similarly situated under principles of stare decisis.39
This result was subsequently applied to welfare litigation in
Jones v. Berman,40 another pre-article 9 decision. Petitioners in

Jones challengad a state regulation 41 that denied emergency welfare
benefits when destitution was caused by the loss, theft or diversion
In a letter to Professor Mauro Cappelletti, Professor Homburger stated:
The need for effective group and public remedies in the United States is
overwhelming. In view of the gradual attrition of public interest litigation in the
federal courts under the harsh command of the Supreme Court, it is gratifying
85.

that we may perhaps expect a compensating upsurge in the states.

Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution, 25 BUFFALO L. Rav. 648, 674 (1976).
86. 86 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 868 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1975) (per curiam).
37. Article 9 became effective on September 1, 1975.
38. Petitioners claims were based on N.Y. Crry Cxiv. CT. Acr. § 110 (k) (McKinncy
Supp. 1978-1979).
89. 36 N.Y.2d at 749, 829 N.E.2d at 661,368 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
40. 87 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 871 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975).
41. 18 N.Y. C.R.R. § 372.2 (c) (deleted July 3, 1975).
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of a previous public assistance grant.42 The court of appeals held
that class action relief was unnecessary. Relying on Rivera, the
court concluded without explanation or elaboration that stare
decisis principles would adequately protect unnamed class members affected by the unlawful regulation. 3
The court, however, ignored a significant distinction between
Rivera and Jones. The stare decisis doctrine is a calculus for deciding cases and governs the conduct of courts, not the conduct of
parties to litigation.44 In Rivera, the conduct of courts and parties
overlapped: respondents were judges of the New York Civil Court
who would be bound, under stare decisis principles, to follow the
dictates of the court of appeals. If the court of appeals had reached
the merits in Rivera and held that state law required respondent
civil court judges to provide a stenographic record to petitioner
Rivera, then a civil court judge receiving a subsequent request
would be bound by the higher court's interpretation of state law. 4"
Thus, in Rivera, class certification was arguably unnecessary because the very party who had authority to act on petitioner's request was also governed directly by stare decisis principles.
In Jones, however, no such identity existed. Respondents included the Commissioner of the State Department of Social Services, the Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of
Social Services, and his counterpart in Albany County. These respondents are not bound by stare decisis. If, after the Jones decision, another welfare recipient in Albany County requests
emergency assistance because of a lost welfare check, the Commissioner there is not required by the decision in Jones to provide
42. 37 N.Y.2d at 48, 332 N.E.2d at 305, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
43. Id. at 57, 332 N.E.2d at 311, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
44. Roscoe Pound explained:
Rightly understood, stare decisis is a feature of the common law technique of
decision. That technique is one of finding the grounds of decision in reported
judicial experience, making for stability by requiring adherence to decisions of
the same question in the past, and allowing growth and change by frecdom of
choice among competing analogies of equal authority when new questions arise
or old ones take on new forms.
3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 562 (1959). See also von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of
Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. Rv. 409 (1924).
45. A prior decision, of course, is not absolutely binding even under stare decisis

principles. 3 R. POUND, supra note 44, at 562. As one court concluded after reviewing numerous authorities: "The controlling principle which emerges from these and other decsions is dear-the doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather
a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly
growth processes of the law to flourish." Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa.
584, 606, 305 A.2d 877, 888 (1973).
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such assistance. Absent class certification, he could continue to
deny emergency grants by arguing that the judgment in Jones
applies only to the named petitioners. 46 Of course, the hypothetical
recipient might bring a lawsuit identical to that initiated by petitioners in Jones, and the court that hears the case might find Jones
controlling under stare decisis principles. Until the court decides
the subsequent suit, however, the hypothetical welfare recipient
will be denied benefits necessary for subsistence. Moreover, if the
recipient is unable to obtain counsel and bring a subsequent lawsuit,4 8 she will receive no protection under the stare decisis doctrine.
The conclusion of the court of appeals in Jones, that stare
decisis is an adequate substitute for class certification, thus cannot be justified by citation to Rivera. Nor is it merely a reflection
of the court's pre-article 9 reluctance to allow class actions. In welfare cases decided after the effective date of article 9, the court of
appeals has continued to rely on Rivera in holding class action
relief inappropriate.49 And, with rare exceptions," the lower courts
in New York have followed without question the Rivera and Jones
46. Defendants could voluntarily conform their conduct to the court's decision, but
stare decisis does not require them to do so. That public officials would ignore the outcome of an individual suit is not merely a theoretical possibility. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lavine,
16,865 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
[1972-1974 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CC)
47. Even if the welfare recipient prevails, she may not receive her benefits until long
after the trial court rules on the petition. By filing a notice of appeal, or an affidavit of

intention to move for permission to appeal, a state or local government official automatically secures a stay of proceedings to enforce the appealed order. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 5519 (a) (1) (McKinney 1978). The welfare recipient may move to vacate the stay, N.Y.
Civ. PAc. LAw § 5519 (c) (McKinney 1978). Vacatur, however, is discretionary with the
appellate courts. 7 J. WEINsEiN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEw YoRK CIVIL PRAMCrcE

5519.15

(1977).
48. See notes 96-109 &accompanying text infra.
49. E.g., Schimmel v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976),
arfg 50 A.D.2d 1085, 377 N.Y.S.2d 313 (4th Dep't 1975); Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d
586, 357 N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976); Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d
794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Barton v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 785, 345 N.E.2d 339, 381 N.Y.S2d
867 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). Although each of these was initiated under
the old class action rule, article 9 was in effect when the court of appeals reviewed the
matter. In Barton, appellants argued that the court must apply the existing law at the
time the appeal is heard. Brief for Appellant at 22. The court did not address this argument in holding the class certification inappropriate. 38 N.Y.2d at 787, 345 N.E.2d at 340,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
50. See, e.g., Doe v. Greco, 62 A.D.2d 498, 405 N.Y.S.2d 801 (3d Dep't 1978); Felder
v. Foster, No. 76-1406 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. Dec. 1, 1977). In Greco the court clearly discerned the limited protection afforded by stare decisis. It stated "that affording plaintiffs
relief while allowing defendants to carry out their threat with respect to all other members
of the class would leave those class members with little recourse. The doctrine of stare
decisis would be of little use at that point .... " 62 A.D.2d at 502, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
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rationale, and have denied motions by welfare litigants for class
certification under the new article 9 provisions.,
The judicially created exception to the availability of class
action relief finds little, if any, basis in the language of New York's
class action rule. Article 9 contains no provision authorizing the
courts to substitute stare decisis principles for the criteria enunciated in the statute. 2 Arguably such authority may be implied in
section 901(a)(5), which permits the courts to consider whether "a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." 53 The subdivision, however, does not sanction a blanket ban on class certification in all
welfare cases. Rather, it requires a case by case determination regarding the desirability of a class action. 4
51. See, e.g., Tavarez v. Sipprell, 62 A.D.2d 631, 405 N.Y.S.2d 531 (4th Dep't 1978);
Turner v. Reed, 52 A.D.2d 739, 382 N.Y.S.2d 391 (4th Dep't 1976); Shook v. Lavine, 49
A.D.2d 238, 374 N.Y.S.2d 187 (4th Dep't 1975); Stutzman v. Fahey, 90 Misc. 2d 501, 397
N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aflJd, 62 A.D.2d 1070, 403 N.Y.S.2d 800 (3d Dep't 1978).

52. Section 901 provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all if:

1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether othenvise
required or permitted, is impracticable;

2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class;

4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of
the class;
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effident adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute may not be maintained as a class action.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 901 (McKinney 1976).
53. N.Y. Civ. PRAc.LAw § 901 (a) (5) (McKinney 1976).
54. In the Practice Commentary to § 901, Professor McLaughlin states:
The fifth factor requires a decision that a class action is superior to other
available methods for determining the controversy. If, for example, plaintiff seeks
to declare a statute unconstitutional there would generally be no need for class
action status since, if one person gets relief, it will inure to the benefit of all.
... On the other hand, if damages are sought for a large number of people, the
class action device may be the best procedure.
McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAW § 901, C901:6 (McKinney
1976). Applying article 9, the courts have not recognized this distinction concerning the
number of people seeking relief, and have denied class certification even when damages
are sought for a large number of people. See Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357
N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976); Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382
N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Schimmel v. Reed, 50 A.D.2d 1085, 377 N.Y.S.2d 313 (4th Dep't 1975),
af'd, 40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976). The suggestion by Professor McLaughlin that there would generally be no need for class designation if only
declaratory relief were sought ignores the instrumental role of the class action rule, and
disregards the intrinsic value of that procedure. See text accompanying notes 63-186 infra.
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The legislative history of article 9 does not suggest that welfare officials as defendants should be exempted from the statutory
provisions. To the contrary, the sparse history reveals that state
officials assumed they would be subject to the new class action rule.
The acting commissioner of the State Department of Social Services
plainly expected that the class provisions would apply to cases
against his department. In a memorandum to the governor's counsel, the acting commissioner commented that "[t]his bill will probably result in increased expenditures of Social Service funds because
of the likelihood increased of numbers [sic] of cases brought as
class actions. Possible increased costs will also result from the notice
requirements and awards of attorneys' fees . .. ." 55 The state attorney general strongly urged approval of the class action bill,
recognizing that the "class action has become an important legal
device in many areas, particularly consumer protection, civil
rights, environmental protection, securities regulation and antitrust." rl
The courts' refusal to certify class actions in welfare cases is
not supported by decisions interpreting rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Some federal courts have held that class
certification was unnecessary when public officials were sued for
injunctive and declaratory relief. 57 Whatever the wisdom of such
a policy,58 it has been limited to lawsuits requesting an injunction
or declaratory judgment, and not applied where plaintiffs seek
damages.5 9 This construction of federal rule 23 has usually been
applied only when the public official defendant affirmatively assured the court that the terms of the final judgment would apply
55. New York State Dep't of Social Services, Memorandum Accompanying Comments
on Bills Before the Governor (June 13, 1975).
56. L. Lefkowitz, Memorandum for the Governor, Re: Assembly 1252-B, at 3 (June 4,
1975) (emphasis added).
57. E.g., United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir.
1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974). Contra, Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1978); Vickers v.
Trainor, 546 F.2d 739, 747 (7th Cir. 1976); Hoehie v. Likins, 538 F.2d 229, 231 (8th Cir.
1977).
1976); Dixon v. Quern, 76 F.R.D. 617, 620 (N.D.Ill.
58. Class certification is necessary even when welfare litigants request only declaratory
or injunctive relief. In such circumstances, class designation eliminates the serious risk of
mootness. Hoehle v. Likins, 538 F.2d 229, 231 (8th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying notes
77-80 infra.
59. See United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir.
1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
Although plaintiffs in Galvan sought monetary restitution, the Second Circuit held that
the district court could conclude that equity did not require such relief. 490 F.2d at 1262.
The court then ruled that class action designation was unnecessary to resolve plaintiffs'
remaining request for an injunction. Id.
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to all persons similarly affected by the challenged policy.6" By contrast, state courts in New York have refused to certify class actions
even in those cases in which monetary relief is sought, or in which
public officials fail to give their assurance that all potential class
members will be afforded the benefit of the judgment.0 1
The decision of the court of appeals, that stare decisis is an
adequate substitute for class certification, finds no support in the
language of article 9, the legislative history of the class action
statute, or federal cases construing similar language in federal
rule 23. Moreover, the court's notion appears contrary to its previous request to the legislature for enactment of a "more liberal
procedure for class actions." 62 Finally, the court's repudiation of
the class action rule disregards both the instrumental and intrinsic
values of the procedural device in welfare litigation.
II.

THE INSTRUMENTAL

ROLE

OF

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Class certification in welfare litigation is not a mere formality,
but serves as a catalytic device that allows the "[transformation of]
legal rights into effective remedies." 63 Unlike the stare decisis doctrine, which serves no instrumental role, the class action procedure
provides the litigant with remedies in three related ways. First,
class certification avoids the pitfalls of the mootness doctrine and
ensures that welfare claims can be fully litigated. Second, the class
mechanism serves as a legal aid device, providing effective access
to the courts for the majority of welfare recipients unable to obtain counsel. Finally, class designation enables final judgments to
be enforced without recourse to separate and independent lawsuits. In this manner, the class procedure and the availability of
classwide relief deter misconduct by state welfare officials and contribute to the "full realization of substantive policy" 04 embodied
in state and federal welfare statutes.
A.

Mootness
The hazards presented by the mootness doctrine are too fa-

60. E.g., Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978); Bacon v. Toia, 437 F. Supp.
1371, 1383 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Lucas v. Wasser, 73 F.R.D. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
61. See note 54 supra.
62. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558,
352 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973).
63. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299,
299 (1973).
64. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1359.
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miliar to those engaged in welfare litigation. During the course of
a lawsuit, the named plaintiff might obtain employment, marry,
relocate or experience some other change in circumstances that
renders her ineligible for public assistance, even if she prevails in
the case. More frequently, defendants will attempt to moot a case
and avoid a decision on the merits by providing relief to the named
parties. 5 In a recent case, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) recipients challenged a New York regulation 66
that permits public assistance grants to be terminated or suspended
prior to an administrative hearing when the issue is one of law or
policy. 7 On the day opposing papers were due on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief, the court was informed that by "an obviously expedited process" defendants had made a decision after
the administrative hearing and confirmed the reduction of plaintiffs' benefits.6 Although plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief
was mooted, the class action was found to be proper, and a preliminary injunction was issued, restraining application of the disputed regulation." Similarly, in an action challenging the notice
provisions sent to welfare recipients terminated for fraud, state
officials attempted to moot the case by offering to reinstate and
provide retroactive benefits to the named plaintiffs.7 1 A federal
court viewed "with dismay" such repeated attempts by the state
to avoid review of its welfare provisions. 72 So too, a state court ob-

served that despite the "theoretical effect of stare decisis" individual lawsuits do not correct the underlying problems, because
the state "can always concede each case is moot when it is ultimately cornered by simply affording the relief." 73
The risk that welfare claims will be rendered moot is further
increased by the fact that the mootness barrier may be erected at
65. Even in a class action, defendants can render a case moot by amending the challenged statute or regulation to fragment or eliminate the members of the aggrieved class.
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 130-34 (1977) (challenge by Pennsylvania mental health
facility patients of state commitment statute).
66. 18 N.Y. C.R.R. § 358.8 (c) (1) (1975).
67. Viverto v. Smith, 421 F. Supp. 1305 (SJD.N.Y. 1976).
68. Id. at 1307.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1313.
71. Lugo v. Dumpson, 390 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Class certification was found
to be appropriate notwithstanding the actions of state welfare officials. Id. at 381-82.
72. Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d
Cir. 1977).
73. Cisco v. Lavine, 72 Misc. 2d 1009, 1013, 340 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (Sup. Ct.), modified
on other grounds, 72 Misc. 2d 1087, 341 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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various stages in the litigation. The plaintiff's claims may become
moot prior to commencement of the lawsuit, 4 during the pendency
of the litigation in the trial court,7 1 or even while the matter is before an appellate court.7 6 A "properly certified class" 7 substantially reduces the likelihood that public officials will successfully
invoke the mootness doctrine to avoid review of their welfare policies.78 Upon certificaton, the unnamed class members acquire a
legal status separate and distinct from that asserted by the named
plaintiff. 9 A continuing controversy between class members and
defendants ensures an adversarial dispute and permits the trial and
appellate courts to reach the merits of the underlying claim. s0
These principles are derived in part from the case or controversy requirement imposed on federal courts by article III of the
United States Constitution.8 1 That requirement, of course, does not
serve as a restraint on the state court's power to decide cases.8 2 New
York courts, 3 like other state courts, 4 have determined that a
matter will not be considered moot "when the underlying questions
are of general interest, substantial public importance and likely to
74. See Lugo v. Dumpson, 390 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
75. See Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
76. See Board of Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See generally Note, The
Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373 (1974).
77. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 133 (1977). "[I]t is only a 'properly certified'
class that may succeed to the adversary position of a named representative whose claim
becomes moot." Id. at 132-33.
78. See Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Blum v.
Toomey, 98 S. Ct. 3081 (1978). In Greklek, the Second Circuit concluded that the district
court properly granted plaintiffs' class action motion "since only class certification could

avert the substantial possibility of the litigation becoming moot prior to decision." 565
F.2d at 1261. As the court observed, "[t]hat very development [mootness], we are told, pre-

vented an earlier adjudication of the issues involved here from averting the necessity for
this action." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 753-57 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
80. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976).
81. The mootness doctrine is also derived from the "policy rules often invoked by the
Court 'to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional questions."' Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 n.8 (1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
82. Accord, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 262 n.8 (1977); Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 87-88,
397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1977); see L. TRIBE, AMERACAN CONMSlTUTIONAL LAw §§ 3-18
(1978).
83. Carr v. Board of Elec., 40 N.Y.2d 556, 559, 356 N.E.2d 713, 715, 388 N.Y.S.2d 87,
89 (1976); Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 57, 332 N.E.2d 383, 311, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422, 433
(1975); Gold v. Lomenzo, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 475-76, 280 N.E.2d 640, 643, 329 N.Y.S.2d 805, 810
(1972).
84. Miller v. North Pole City Council, 532 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Alas. 1975); Gordon v.
Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 326 n.1, 525 P.2d 72, 74 n.1, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 634 n.1
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975); Ervin v. Capital weekly Post, Inc., 97 So. 2d 464,
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arise with frequency... ."

85

The New York Court of Appeals has

stated that when questions are important and likely to recur they
are "properly entertainable by this court, irrespective of any allegation of mootness." s6 Accordingly, class certification may be unnecessary, since in appropriate circumstances the state court will review
claims notwithstanding the absence of a continuing controversy
between the original parties to the proceeding.
The proposed "important question" exception to mootness
must be rejected for two reasons. The public interest doctrine described in Jones is the exception rather than the rule. More important, reliance on the exception to the requirement of a
continuing controversy between the parties may preclude state
court welfare litigants from seeking Supreme Court review, which
is dependent on the continued existence of an article III case or
controversy.8 7 This consideration is especially important to plaintiffs in welfare cases, who frequently allege that a state statute or
regulation violates the Federal Constitution or is inconsistent with
the Federal Social Security Act. Having been forced by Edelman
to bring those claims in state court, the welfare litigant's only opportunity for federal court consideration of her constitutional or
federal statutory claims lies with an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. Absent class certification, that opporunity is foreclosed if the representative party's individual claims are moot at
the time review is sought.
The Supreme Court's decision in DeFunisv. Odegaard 8 illus-

trates the risk confronting state court litigants who fail to obtain
class certification in cases raising federal claims. DeFunis commenced an individual action in a state court alleging that the
University of Washington Law School's admission policies discriminated against him in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
At the time of oral argument in the Washington Supreme Court,
DeFunis was in fact attending the law school8 9 Nevertheless, that
court did not consider the case moot "[d]ue to the conditions under which plaintiff was admitted and the great public interest in
466 (Fla. 1957); Lawyer's Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 294 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Mo. 1956); Busik
v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d
11, 23 n.6, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 n.6 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 812 (1974).
85. Gold v. Lomenzo, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 475-76, 280 N.E.2d 640, 643, 829 N.Y.S.2d 805,
810 (1972).
86. Jones v. Berman, 87 N.Y.2d 42, 57, 832 N.E.2d 308, 811, 871 N.YS.2d 422, 483
(1975).
87. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
88. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
89. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 23 n.6, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 n.6 (1973).
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the continuing issues raised by this appeal ....." 90 The United
States Supreme Court recognzed that as a matter of state law the
case was saved from mootness because of the public interest in
the issue. 1 It held, however, that even when cases are commenced
in state court, mootness under article III is a federal question,
which a federal court must resolve.92 Because DeFunis was attending the law school at the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
his individual claims were found moot. 3 Moreover, since the case
was not certified as a class action, and did not fall within two narrow exceptions,"' there was no case or controversy that the Court

could review.
A similar fate awaits the state court litigant who is denied
class certification in a case challenging a state welfare policy as unconstitutional or inconsistent with federal law. If circumstances
of the representative party change, or if the defendants afford the
named plaintiff full benefits, the state court might nevertheless
entertain the case because of its public importance. The Supreme
Court would lack power under article III to review the matter;
however, the welfare recipient, compelled to initiate her case in
90. Id.
91. 416 U.S. at 316.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 317.
94. "There is a line of decisions . . . [by this Court] standing for the proposition
that the 'voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of
power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.'" Id. at 818
(quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 845 U.S. 629, 682 (1953)). This proposition is
premised on the fear that a defendant might change his policy, but then "return to his
old ways" upon dismissal of the case. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 682.
The doctrine applies only if the mootness question is based on the defendant's unilateral
change with relation to the challenged policy. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 318. If
instead, as in DeFunis, the question on mootness arises from a change in the named
plaintiff's circumstances, or because the defendant has agreed to provide benefits to the
named party (although not changing the underlying policy), the W.T. Grant exception
does not save the suit from the mootness bar. Id.
In DeFunis, the Court also noted that an otherwise moot case may be adjudicated if it
presents a question that is "'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id. at 318-19
(quoting Southern Pac. Ter. Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). That exception applies
,only to questions "which, by their very nature, are not likely to survive the course of a
normal litigation." Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (emphasis added). As the Court explained in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per

curiam):
[]n the absence of a class action, the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
doctrine was limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.
Id. at 149. Accordingly, these exceptions are unavailing to the welfare litigant who is provided the requested benefits, or who is no longer eligible for public assistance because of
a change in personal circumstances.
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state court, would be denied any opportunity for federal court
consideration of her federal claims.
The class action rule thus plays an instrumental role in welfare litigation not otherwise performed by the stare decisis doctrine.
Class certification removes the mootness barrier to adjudication
of issues at both the trial and appellate levels and prevents premature termination of the litigation. In so doing, the procedural
device permits claims to be fully litigated and thereby assists in
the definition and effectuation of the values served by the substantive public assistance provisions.
B. Access to Courts
Opponents of class certification in welfare cases might argue
that the role of the class action rule in preventing mootness has
been overemphasized. They would maintain that if the named
plaintiff is reinstated by welfare officials and provided retroactive
benefits, she has little, if any, interest in prosecuting the lawsuit.
Moreover, other recipients are available to challenge the purportedly unlawful policy. If no other individuals are aggrieved,
class certification would have been denied in the first instance for
failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement.9 5 Thus, the argument would continue, substantive welfare policy can be vindicated
by a subsequent lawsuit without class certification in the initial
action.
This line of reasoning is superficial at best. It ignores the
possibility that, to prevent a decision on the merits, public officials
might attempt to moot subsequent cases by providing relief to the
representative party. The argument also erroneously assumes that
other welfare recipients can readily gain access to the courts. To
the contrary, the inability of such individuals to obtain legal representation and initiate individual lawsuits is one reason why class
certification is essential in welfare litigation. Notwithstanding the
efforts of the National Legal Services Corporation 9 and its predecessor, the Legal Services Program,97 most of the poor 8have either
95. To fulfill the numerosity requirement, the class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members whether otherwise required or permitted is impracticable." N.Y. Crv.
PRAc. LAw § 901 (a) (1) (McKinney 1976).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b (1976).
97. See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 222 (a) (3),
81 Stat. 672 (repealed 1974).
98. For purposes of this section, the poor include those persons who would satisfy the
financial eligibility requirements promulgated by the National Legal Services Corporation.
For all states (except Alaska and Hawaii) the maximum income levels are as follows:
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no access, or grossly inadequate access, to legal representation.
The statistics are disquieting. Dean Roger Cramton, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the National Legal Services Corporation,
reported in 1976 that 12 million people-forty percent of the poor
-live in areas that are not covered by legal services programs."
Of the remaining 17 million poor people, nearly 6 million reside
in areas that have less than one legal services attorney for every
10,000 poor persons. 10 Ten million of the poor live in areas where
there is only the equivalent of one or two legal services attorneys
for every 10,000 poor individuals. 101 Increases in congressional
appropriations for the National Legal Services Corporation have
led to expansion in the number of indigent persons served by legal
services programs.0 2 Recent statistics, however, reveal that the
national average of one legal services lawyer for every 8,787 poor
people remains well below the estimated number of attorneys serving the general population. 0 3
In New York, as elsewhere, the poor are denied meaningful
access to legal representation. Because legal services programs are
lacking in nineteen of the state's sixty-two counties, 04 the poor 101
residing in these counties are effectively barred from obtaining
access to the courts. Even in those counties covered by legal services
programs, the number of lawyers falls far short of that required
to adequately serve the indigent population. 00
Size of Family Unit

Dollar Amount

1

3713

4913
2
8
6113
4
7313
5
8513
6
9713
For family units with more than six members, $960 is added for each additional
member. 42 Fed. Reg. 24,271 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 1611).
99. Cramton, Promiseand Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 672 (1976).
100. Id. at 673.
101. Id.
102. Houseman, Equal Protection and the Poor, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 887, 894 (1977).
103. There are 14 attorneys for every 10,000 persons in the general population. Id.
at 895 n.47.
104. Letter and attached material from Stephen S. Walters, Deputy General Counsel,
Legal Services Corporation to author (May 23, 1978). Data provided reveal that the following counties are not being served by federally funded legal services offices: Genesee,
Fulton, Wyoming, Saratoga, Livingston, Warren, Ontario, Washington, Wayne, Montgomery, Yates, Seneca, Tompkins, Tioga, Oswego, Jefferson, Otsego, Delaware, and Schoharie. The following counties are partially served: Erie, Cortland, Madison, and Chenago.
105. Id. Data indicate that 155,714 poor people reside in areas that are not presently
served by the National Legal Services Corporation. Some of these individuals may have
access to locally funded legal aid offices; however, these offices rarely undertake classwide
law reform litigation on behalf of welfare recipients. See generally J. HANDLER, E. HoLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PuRSurr OF LEGAL RIGHTS 19 (1978); E. JOHNsON,
supra note 4, at 3-9.
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106. Letter, supra note 104. The following chart provided by the National Legal
Services Corporation reveals the number of federally funded attorneys in each of the
counties served by the corporation.
NEW YORK STATE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
SERVICE AREAS AND NUMBER or ATTORNEYS

Program&Name
Legal Aid Society
of Albany, Inc.
Albany, N.Y.
Orleans Legal Aid
Bureau, Inc.
Albion, N.Y.
Broome Legal
Assistance Corp.
Binghamton, N.Y.
Neighborhood L.S., Inc.
Buffalo, N.Y.
Chautauqua County L.S.,
Inc. Dunkirk, N.Y.
Chemung County
Neighborhood L.S., Inc.
Elmira, N.Y.
Nassau County Law
Services Committee
Hempstead, N.Y.
Legal Aid Society of
Rockland County, Inc.
New City, N.Y.
Community Action for
Legal Services
New York, N.Y.
Niagara County Legal
Aid Society, Inc.
Niagara Falls, N.Y.
Mid-Hudson L.S., Inc.
Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
Monroe County Legal
Assistance Corp.
Rochester, N.Y.
Onondaga
Neighborhood L.S.
Syracuse, N.Y.
Legal Aid Society of
Oneida County, Inc.
Utica, N.Y.
Westchester L.S., Inc.
White Plains, N.Y.
North Country LS., Inc.
Wilmington, N.Y.
Total

Fiscal Year 1977
1978 Expansion
No. of
Service
Attorneys
Service
Poverty
No. of
per 10,000
Poverty Population
Attorneys Population Increase
Poor

Service Areas
(counties)

3.30

17

51,427

-

Schenectady, Albany &
Rensselaer

8.84

3

3,393

-

Orleans

2.12

4

18,809

1.89

13

68,507

-

Erie (partial)

2.35

4

16,960

-

Chautauqua

5.27

6

11,369

1.66

21

125,821

-

Nassau & Suffolk

4.20

5

11,891

-

Rockland

1.43

167

1,164,673

-

Kings, Queens, Richmond,
New York & Bronx

3

19,348

-

Niagara

.72

19

69,641

-

.90

7

77,009

-

Green, Columbia, Sullivan,
Ulster, Duchess, Orange &
Putnam
Monroe, Cattaraugus,
Allegany & Steuben

.13

13

41,404

11,621

Onondaga, Cayuga &
Cortland (partial)

.37

6

25,291,

14,029

Oneida, Lewis, Herkimer &:
Madison (partial counties)

.76

15

54,274

-

1.72

"303

4,218

1,818

-

-

38,331

1,759,817

69,657

Broome & Chenango
(partial)

Chemung & Schuyler

Westchester
St. Lawrence, Franklin,
Clinton, Essex & Hamilton
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The human consequences must not be obscured by these statistics. As Dean Cramton has observed:
It is easy to lose sight of the poor themselves and their legal
problems in the welter of statistics about the poor and their need
for legal services. While the statistics are compelling, behind the
numbers are real people ....

They are clients who might never

dream of entering the
office of a private attorney since they have
107
no money to do so.

Dean Cramton's observations are particularly applicable to welfare recipients who, by definition, are living at, or below, a subsistence level. The monthly budget of the recipient includes no
money for a private attorney; consequently, she must rely completely on free legal representation. Without access to such representation, her statutory and constitutional rights become
unenforceable and, in many respects, meaningless. 08 The bounds
of welfare recipient rights are no longer defined by statute or constitution, but become solely dependent on the interpretation
adopted by the welfare agency. Administrative determinations
become final and unreviewable for those recipients denied access
to the courts. 10 9
The class action rule is a salutary procedural tool for providing legal assistance to the poor and ensuring protection of.
substantive rights." 0 A welfare recipient who is unable to obtain
representation because she fortuitously resides in an area without
a legal services office, or without an adequate number of legal
107. Cramton, supra note 99, at 672.
108.
The conditions, under which our customary system requires litigation to be conducted, impair rights guaranteed by substantive law because law is not selfenforcing; only through application in the courts does the law have life and force.
The most fundamental rights remain idle abstractions unless the courts are able
to give them efficacy through enforcement.
R. SmrrH, supra note 1, at 16; see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 871, 887 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part).
109. An administrative "fair hearing" procedure may be invoked by the recipient to
request the state agency to review a decision by local social services officials. N.Y. Soc. SERv.
Lvw § 131 (9) (McKinney 1976); 18 N.Y. C.R.R. § 358. That procedure is most effective
when the individual is challenging the particular application of a valid policy. It is less
effective when the recipient is contending that a statewide statute or regulation is unconstitutional or inconsistent with federal law. See Cordova v. Reed, 521 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.
1975). Moreover, without legal representation, the recipient is effectively barred from
obtaining judicial review if the state agency's fair hearing decision confirms the construction of the challenged policy by the local welfare official.
110. See Bennett, Liberty, Equality, and Welfare Reform, 68 N.W.U.L. Rav. 74, 82
(1973). "[T'he denial of class relief is tantamount to a denial of substantive justice." State
Class Actions, supra note 20, at 641.
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services attorneys, nevertheless will have her interests protected
as a member of a certified class in a class action suit.1 1 The final
judgment will embrace all persons the court found to be members
of the class.11 2
The class action rule also removes the necessity for duplicative lawsuits by those who secure representation, since in one suit
the court may resolve the claims of all individuals similarly affected by the challenged policy. Plainly, this prevents a needless

drain on judicial resources as well as the limited resources of the
legal services offices and the welfare agency. Regulations recently
promulgated by the National Legal Services Corporation acknowledge this role of class actions, and credit a properly administered
class action rule with the economical and effective delivery of legal
assistance." 8
In contrast, the stare decisis doctrine neither acts as a legalaid device nor assists in conserving the resources of the court or
parties. Since that doctrine governs the conduct of courts, it may
not be invoked until a recipient has filed a subsequent lawsuit.
Only then may the litigant assert that a prior decision is controlling. Reliance on the stare decisis principles encourages successive
litigation, and protects only those able to gain access to a judicial
forum. In this regard, stare decisis is the antithesis of, rather than
a substitute for, the class action procedure.
A recent case clearly illustrates the advantages of the class
action rule, as well as the inadequacies of the stare decisis doctrine,
as a legal aid mechanism. In 1977, the New York Legislature
111. The class action procedure also protects the interests of those recipients who are
reluctant to challenge a policy and thereby upset the relationship between them and the
agency. See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 479, 494 (1966) ("In short, in calculating whether to fight the [agency's] decision . . .the [welfare] mother has to weigh the costs to her on-going relationship with
the local agency . ...
Professor Handler suggests that the behavior of welfare officials is better controlled by
strengthening the administrative process rather than by emphasizing the adversary system.
Id. at 510. He concedes, however, that in some circumstances recourse to the courts will
be necessary. Id. at 496. One might quarrel with Professor Handler about the degree of
reliance he places on the administrative system, and the specific circumstances when judicial
review will be essential. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YAE L.J. 1245, 1252 (1965). Once the welfare litigant determines that
judicial review is required, she should be afforded the same class action opportunities
available to litigants seeking to enforce traditional property interests.
112. Sosna'v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395 n.8 (1975); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c); N.Y. Cxv.
Pasc. LAw § 905 (McKinney 1976).
113. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,607 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 1617); cf. R. POSNER,
AN ECONo sc APPROACH TO LEGAL STUDIES 399, 493 (1973) (class action rule achieves
economy of scale in litigation).
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amended the Social Services Law to limit the amount of increases
in the monthly shelter allowance available to any recipient who
received a grant in a prior three month period." 4 Welfare recipients immediately filed a lawsuit, alleging that the amendment denied them shelter grants sufficient to meet their housing needs."'
The parties claimed that the amended statute violated the federal
Social Security Act as well as the New York and United States
Constitutions. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the
trial court concluded that the challenged legislation contravened
the New York State Constitution."' The court ordered each named
plaintiff and intervenor to be paid the sum each was denied because of the operation of the unconstitutional statute."1 Relying
on Jones v. Berman,""' however, the court denied plaintiffs' class
action motion, stating that "a class action would be inappropriate
and not superior to other available methods." 119 The court's reference to Jones indicates that it was alluding to the stare decisis
doctrine. Consequently, only the named parties received retroactive benefits despite the unconstitutional statewide application of
the statute. Other welfare recipients must file identical lawsuits
to recover the wrongfully withheld benefits. 20 This will lead to a
proliferation of lawsuits, an increase in the courts' workload, and
additional expenditure of funds by all parties. Less fortunate recipients who are unable to obtain representation and commence
independent actions are prevented from recovering their public
assistance. 2 '
In these circumstances it is disingenuous to suggest that class
certification is unnecessary and that stare decisis will protect nonparty welfare recipients. Class action designation in cases like
114. N.Y. Soc. SERV. Lw § 131-a (3-a) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
115. Sherwood v. Toia, 92 Misc. 2d 149, 400 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
116. The court held the legislation unconstitutional under art. 3, § 1 of the New
York Constitution "in that it constitutes an impermissible delegation of [legislative power]."
Id. at 150, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
117. Id, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
118. 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E. 2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975).

119. Denial of motion for class action designation, by the Honorable Morrie Slifkin,
Sherwood v. Toia, No. 77-2973 (Sup. Ct., Orange Co. Sept. 27, 1977).
120. At least one such lawsuit was filed subsequent to the Sherwood decision. Judson
v. Blum, No. 78-4759 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co., filed April 27, 1978).
121. It might be argued that the fair hearing procedure will protect those recipients
unable to initiate judicial proceedings. See note 109 supra; Barton v. Lavine, 54 A.D.2d
350, 354, 389 N.Y.S2d 416, 418 (3d Dep't 1976). The administrative hearing, however, is
conducted by the State Department of Social Services and provides no protection if the

state agency insists on continued application of the challenged policy. Judical review is
necessary in those instances to compel the state to uniformly alter application of its policy.
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Sherwood 122 would avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits, and the concomitant drain on resources. At the same time, it would effectively
guarantee that impoverished individuals who are foreclosed from
initiating a proceeding would have an opportunity to be heard. 123

C. Enforcement
The class action procedure is superior to the doctrine of stare
decisis as a catalyst permitting judgments to be enforced economically and effectively. Perhaps underlying the New York
courts' reliance on stare decisis is the belief that welfare officials
will obey court orders and that declaratory or injunctive relief
will shield the rights of the members of a proposed class. The
courts apparently assume that if officials are enjoined from applying a policy to one individual, they will voluntarily cease application of that policy to others similarly situated, and enforcement
proceedings will be unnecessary.'1 Examination of the actual conduct of welfare officials in New York belies any such assumption.
Plaintiffs in Doe v. Lavine 125 challenged a New York statute
requiring female welfare recipients to identify the putative father
of their children, and establish paternity as a condition of eligibility for welfare benefits. The court held that "binding precedent
compelled the conclusion" that the state law was contrary to the
122. Sherwood is only one of many illustrations of the inability of the stare decisis
doctrine to perform a legal-aid function and assist in conserving judicial resources. Perhaps the most dramatic example is provided by litigation challenging a previous New
York method for calculating rental allowances for families containing both S.S.I. and
A.X.D.C. recipients. Because New York courts refused to certify welfare suits as class actions,
and because welfare officials failed to treat lawsuits by individual recipients as binding in
subsequent cases challenging the same state practice, welfare litigants were forced to commence at least nine separate actions attacking the state's policy. See Schimmel v. Reed,
40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976), af'g 50 A.D.2d 1085, 377 N.Y.S2d
313 (1975); Barton v. Lavine, 54 A.D.2d 350, 389 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1976); Buss v.
Berger, No. 75-11928 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. Mar. 24, 1976); Peterson v. Berger, 84 Misc. 2d
517, 377 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Robinson v. Reed, No. 75-8473 (Sup. Ct., Monroe
Co. Dec. 15, 1975); Tanner v. Lavine, No. 75-108760 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co. July 22, 1975);
Cummins v. Lascaris, No. 75-3159 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. June 30, 1975); Burton v.
Lavine, No. 74-9546 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. Oct. 18, 1974); Wimbush v. Lavine, No. 74-9547
(Sup. Ct., Albany Co. Sept. 23, 1974). In each case, the court held that the New York method
for calculating shelter allowances conflicted with the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (24)
(1973). Only the named petitioners, however, recovered the wrongfully withheld welfare
benefits.
123. Morgan v. Sieloff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976).
124. "[W]here governmental practices have been challenged, class action certification
is inappropriate since a presumption exists that a determination will be adhered to as
binding upon the state in similar cases .... " Community Serv. Soc'y v. Welfare Insp.
Gen., 91 Misc. 2d 383, 389, 398 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (1977).
125. 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Social Security Act; 128 however, the court denied class relief on

the ground that a declaratory judgment "should be sufficient to
induce obedience." 12" This assumption "turned out to be an illusion." 128 The state continued to deny benefits to those individuals who refused to comply with the unlawful statute, and as
a result, a second lawsuit was initiated challenging the identical
provision. In the subsequent suit, the court recognized that state
welfare officials had not reconciled their conduct with the judgment in Doe:
The welfare department decided after Doe v. Lavine to continue

to enforce its policies throughout the state against everybody except Doe complainants, and so provided, through an administrative letter . . . pertaining to the court's prior decision and

preliminary injunction and restricting the operation of the preliminary injunction only of the named complainants in the
action.129
The court did not understand how the state could "in good conscience ...

deny equal treatment to its citizens equally situated,"

and held that class certification was necessary.3 0
Unfortunately, these cases are not isolated incidents of recalcitrance by welfare officials. One commentator has observed that
"[p]overty lawyers have experienced great difficulties in getting
welfare officials to comply with current decisional law and even
injunctive provisions." 181 While the problem has been "particularly acute" 132 in New York, it has not been limited to that juris3
diction.

1

Disregard of court orders and decisional law by public officials may be due to administrative obstacles 134 or outright intransi-

126. Id. at 361.
127. Id. at 362. The court did not explain how declaratory relief would assist those
entitled to benefits but unable to initiate proceedings on their own behalf.
128. Lewis v. Lavine, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] Poe. L. REP. (CC-) 1 16,865
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Schwartz, Recent Welfare Litigation, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 30, 1974, at 4, col. 3; cf.
Glasser, Prisonersof Benevolence, in DOING GOOD: THE Limrrs OF BENEVOLENCE 136 (1978)
(the capacity of bureaucratic institutions to absorb criticism and even court orders without

changing is almost inexhaustible). See also Subron & Sutton, Welfare Class Action-Federal
Court: A
132.
133.
134.

ProceduralAnalysis, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 21, 25 (1973).
Schwartz, supra note 131, at 4, col. 3.
See id.
See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
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gence. 185 In either event, enforcement proceedings may be required to obtain compliance with a previous judgment. If, as in
Doe v. Lavine,'138 a court declares a statewide statute invalid but

denies class certification, providing relief only to the named plaintiffs, and if, despite the declaration, welfare officials continue to
enforce the invalid statute against all recipients other than the
representative parties, additional proceedings will be required to
obtain compliance. Having received their benefits, the named
plaintiffs may have little incentive to undertake enforcement action. Even assuming the requisite incentive, they may be prevented from prosecuting a contempt proceeding by the mootness
doctrine. 13 7 Other individuals similarly affected by the unlawful
statute will be forced to seek post-judgment intervention 138 or

commence independent lawsuits. Once again, reliance on stare
decisis leads to a proliferation of cases and expenditure of scarce resources. Reliance on stare decisis also effectively precludes relief
for those individuals unable to obtain counsel for the intervention
application or independent suit.
The class action procedure provides a more satisfactory response to the enforcement problems.1 3 9 The representative party

and her attorney have an obligation to protect the interests of the
unnamed class members, and enforcement proceedings can be initiated without the necessity of intervening new parties or instituting additional lawsuits.1 40 The threat or reasonable likelihood of
a class action proceeding may itself be sufficient to induce compliance with the court's order. The interest of judicial economy would
be served and, equally important, the underlying substantive values
would be preserved.
The Relationship Between Class Action Procedure and Subtantive Law
The functions served by the class action rule are not only
laudable in themselves, but also serve as a means to a more urgent
D.

135. See Knudsen v. Nassau Co. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 77 Misc. 2d 402, 352 N.Y.S.2d 853
(Sup. Ct. 1974).
136. 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
137. See Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977).
138. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1012 (McKinney 1976). See 2 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KoRN
1012.07 (1978) (courts reluctant to grant post-judgment
& A. MILLER, supra note 47, at
intervention for new parties).
139. 5 H. NEwBERG, CLASS ACTrONs 498 (1977).
140. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 901 (a) (4) (McKinney 1976).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

goal-the realization of underlying welfare policies. Procedural devices contribute to the development of substantive law,14 ' and the
class action procedure is plainly no exception. 42 By removing mootness barriers, by serving as a legal aid device, and by allowing economical enforcement of judgments, the class procedure deters
unlawful conduct by welfare officials and assists in the development of substantive welfare law. Unfortunately, in rejecting the
class procedure, New York courts have ignored the symbiotic relationship between the procedural rule and substantive law.
In examining this relationship it may be useful to designate
the class of persons affected by a policy in mathematical terms as
the following set: (A', A 2 , A 3, . . . An).' 43 The focus of a lawsuit
challenging the policy is not on any individual member of the set,
as in the traditional litigation model.'" Instead, the subject matter
of the action concerns "whether or how a government policy or
program shall be carried out." '" It matters little whether A', A 2,
or any other member of the class commences the lawsuit. So, too,
litigants A' and A 2 are no more entitled to relief than A', A 4, ...
An. Each is affected in similar fashion by the contested provisions.
Viewed in this way, the relationship between the application
of the class action rule and substantive welfare policy is apparent.
The underlying welfare policy is more likely to be enforced by
welfare officials as the cost of noncompliance increases. 40 For officials who elect to deny welfare benefits to A', A 2, A 3 , . . . An, the
cost of noncompliance is relatively small if class certification is
denied and court-ordered relief applies only to Al, A 2, A, the few

members of the proposed class able to initiate a lawsuit. Absent
the threat of classwide relief, welfare officials will have a financial
incentive to ignore or redefine the legislative mandate expressed
in state or federal statutes. This results in an alteration of legisla141. As Professor Hazard has observed, "[s]ubstantive law is shaped and articulated
by procedural possibilities." Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Sub.
stantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973). See also Cappelletti & Garth, Access to Justice:
The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L.
REv. 181, 185 (1978); Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
142. See Developments in the Law-ClassActions, supra note 8, at 1359, 1371.
143. Professor Hazard uses this mathematical set to represent an indefinitely large
number of similarly aggrieved individuals. Hazard, supra note 141, at 310-11.
144. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAhv. L. REv.

1281 (1976); Hazard, supra note 141, at 310.
145. Chayes, supra note 144, at 1295.
146. The cost of noncompliance includes not only the amount of the retroactive bene.
fits wrongfully withheld, but also the attorney's fees that may be awarded in class actions
under article 9; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 909 (McKinney 1976).
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tive policy and the legislative role is shifted from legislators to ad47
ministrators.
Recent litigation challenging New York's method for calculating A.F.D.C. benefits highlights the extent to which denial of
class certification breeds administrative disincentives to comply
with substantive law. In the Social Security Amendments of 1972,148
Congress added a section providing that an individual receiving
benefits under the S.S.I. program 149 should not be regarded as a
member of a family when determining the family's grant under
the separate A.F.D.C. program. 50 The amendment was designed
to prevent reliance on "cooperative budgeting" techniques that result in lower total welfare grants to a family unit. Congress provided that the amendment "shall be effective on and after January
1, 1973." ' Despite this explicit congressional directive, welfare
officials in New York continued to enforce their cooperative budgeting regulation well after January 1, 1973.152 As late as August of
that year, families were being denied the increased grants that
would result from calculations based on the new Social Security
Amendments. Plaintiffs in Barton v. Lavine

53

challenged New

York's regulation as inconsistent with federal law and invalid under the supremacy clause. Defending the agency's action, the Commissioner of the State Department of Social Services apparently
argued that when Congress said "January 1, 1973" it really meant
a later date. 54 The court of appeals found the agency position untenable:
The amendment to the Social Security Act in issue here...
is plainly effective as of January 1, 1973. It would have been appropriate to resort to legislative history for clarification were the effec147. It has been argued that because of an increased cost of noncompliance, the
effect of class certification may be to overdeter public officials, and force them to settle
even a frivolous lawsuit. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1361.
Such a fear is unrealistic in welfare litigation. The danger that class certification will lead
to overdeterrence is most prevalent in cases involving complex factual issues and substantial
litigation expenses. Id. at 1364-65. The focus of this article is on welfare cases in which
the issues concern questions of law, and the cost of litigation is relatively minimal. In
such circumstances, there is little likelihood that class certification will result in overdeterrence and premature settlement of frivolous claims.
148. Act of Oct. 17, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified in scattered
sections of 1 & 42 U.S.C.).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976); see note 7 supra.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (24) (1976).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 602 note (1976).

152.

18 N.Y. C.R.R. § 352.2[e] (1) (1974).

153. 38 N.Y.2d 785, 345 N.E.2d 339, 381 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1975) (mem.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 985 (1976).
154. Id. at 787, 345 NYE.2d at 339-40, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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tive date ambiguous upon the face of the statute. "January 1, 1973"

could scarcely be more unambiguous. We decline the invitation to
sit as a committee on revision. 155
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of petitioners' class
action motion, however, stating that "[w]e do not find a class action appropriate in these circumstances." 156 Thus, Ms. Barton and
some of the other litigants who initiated lawsuits obtained relief, 1 7
while thousands of other individuals in New York were denied
welfare benefits mandated by Congress.""8 Although the welfare
officials were unsuccessful in the lawsuit, they effectively prevailed
in altering the intended scope of the congressional policy. Moreover, by denying class certification, the court joined the administrators in sitting as a "committee on revision" and amended the
social security provision to provide increased benefits only for those
A.F.D.C. families who challenged the state's unlawful regulation.
Failure to afford class action status in cases like Barton encourages official disregard of substantive law, and places a judicial
imprimatur on the administrative usurpation of legislative
power." 9 With relative immunity, welfare officials can avoid or
adopt contrived interpretations of substantive law, and thereby redefine the boundaries of the legislature's mandate. As the California
Supreme Court recently stated, conduct of an administrative agency
in such circumstances is "reminiscent of a journey into the fictional
155. Id.
156. Id. The decision was rendered after the effective date of article 9, but the court
did not mention the relevancy of the new provision. See note 49 supra.
157. See, e.g., Brown v. Lavine, No. 76-1855 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1976). But see
Fingland v. Lavine, 88 Misc. 2d 1085, 390 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 54 A.D.2d 1096, 889
N.Y.S.2d 560 (4th Dep't 1976). Petitioners in Fingland were denied relief because their
fair hearing request was made 63 days after the state was required to cease application of
its cooperative budgeting regulation. State law provides that the hearing request "must be
made within sixty days after the date of the action or failure to act complained of."
N.Y. Soc. SFRv. LAW § 135-a (McKinney 1976). The court rejected petitioners' argument
that the local commissioner's "failure to act" was his failure to make corrective retroactive
payments. 88 Misc. 2d at 1086, 890 N.Y.S.2d at 354. The court also found unpersuasive the
contention that Barton tolled the statute of limitations for members of the proposed class
"upon the commencement of the proceeding." Id. Contra, American Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). "[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class .. " Id. at 554.
158. Ms. Barton contended in the court of appeals that approximately 11% of the
A.F.D.C. families in New York were underpaid as a result of New York's adherence to its
unlawful regulation. Brief of Appellant Barton at 10. The state conceded that the underpayment to A.F.D.C. families was approximately $9.7 million. Brief of RespondentAppellant Lavine at 47-48.
159. Similarly, denial of class certification encourages state legislators to disregard
applicable federal law and thus allows the state to usurp Congress' power to establish
the bounds of the federal welfare programs. See note 9 supra.
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realms visited by Alice through the looking glass." 160 That court
observed:
In the fanciful world of Lewis Carroll, the inhabitants could turn
fact into fiction and fiction into fact by mere ipse dixit. As Humpty
Dumpty scornfully informed Alice, "When I use a word it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all."
Like Humpty Dumpty, the department confronts us with the
question "which is to be master"-the department or the Legislature? The department's position is as precarious and untenable as
Humpty's seat on the wall.' 6 '

The tragedy of decisions like Barton is that they thwart actual legislative policy and bring "all-too-real hardships to very real children."

162

III.

THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF CLASS CERTIFICATION

The stare decisis doctrine fails to perform any of the functions
served by the class action rule and impedes the conversion of sub-

stantive rights into actual remedies. Nevertheless, New York
courts adhere to the notion that class certification is unnecessary
in welfare cases and that stare decisis principles will protect nonparty recipients. The automatic application of the Jones rationale

is not, and could not be, premised on a realistic comparison of the
relative merits of the stare decisis doctrine and the class action procedure. While the decisions assert the superiority of stare decisis,
they do so without enumerating the advantages of that doctrine
over class action designation. The manifest instrumental benefits
of the class action procedure, and the absence of any explanation
for the court's contrary conclusion, force the litigant to speculate on
the reasons for the courts' continued observance of the fiction
enunciated in Jones.6 '
160. Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 872, 524 P.2d 97, 107, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11
(1974).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163.

State courts generally are reluctant to certify class actions. See State Class Ac-

tions, supra note 20, at 643. That reluctance does not explain the narrow construction by
the New York courts of article 9 in welfare cases, since judicial influence helped initiate
liberalization of the class action rule. See text accompanying notes 27-28, supra.
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One possible explanation for the exclusion of welfare cases
from the application of article 9 may be the court's reluctance to
order relief that will have a significant fiscal impact on state and
local governmental units.'" An award of retroactive benefits to an
entire class, or a judgment directing a classwide increase in benefits
prospectively, would impose a financial burden on state and local
resources. Increases in recent welfare costs have generated considerable opposition and, in some instances, court challenges by local
government officials. 165 Judicial aversion to use of the class action
rule in welfare cases may reflect an unwillingness to exacerbate
fiscal problems.
This can serve as only a partial explanation, however. In nonwelfare cases, involving traditional property interests,100 the New
York judiciary has not refrained from directing relief that has had
a burdensome economic impact on government units. For example,
the court of appeals declared unconstitutional the Emergency
Moratorium Act of 1975,167 despite the adverse impact of such a
decision on the dire economic situation of New York City.'0 8 Similarly, fear of a fiscal crisis did not deter that court from holding
invalid a statute 109 designed to ease the fiscal burden on local governments and "prevent possible disruption of municipal functions." 170 One lower court has explained: "The fiscal crisis that
now confronts most of our cities and school districts-and even the
state itself-may not be used as a vehicle for the design of laws that
circumvent the Constitution." in
While these cases do not present class certification questions,
they reveal a judicial willingness to render decisions that have sig164. See Schimmel v. Reed, 50 A.D.2d 1085, 577 N.Y.S.2d 313 (4th Dep't 1975), afJ'd,
40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976).
165. See, e.g., Toia v. Regan, 40 N.Y.2d 837, 356 N.E.2d 276, 887 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1976),
appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1082 (1977); Toia v. Schueler, 55 A.D.2d 621, 389 N.Y.S.2d 414
(2d Dep't 1976).
166. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733 (1964); tenBrock and
Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 237, 257-59 (1954).
167. Law of Nov. 14, 1975, ch. 874, 1976 N.Y. Laws 23 (1975 Extra Sess.) (McKinney).
168. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assist. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 739, 358 N.E.2d
848, 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22,28 (1976).
169. Law of May 18, 1970, ch. 923, § 2, 1970 N.Y. Laws 2861 (repealed 1974).
170. Hurd v. City of Buffalo, 41 A.D2d 402, 404, 343 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (4th Dep't
1973), af'd, 34 N.Y.2d 628, 311 N.E.2d 504, 355 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974). See also Waldert v.
City of Rochester, 90 Misc. 2d 472, 395 N.Y.S.2d 939, modified, 61 A.D.2d 147, 402
N.Y.S.2d 655 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 831, 378 N.E.2d 115, 406 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1978).
171. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Educ., 91 Misc. 2d 258, 260, 397 N.Y.S.2d 882,
883 (Sup. Ct. 1977), modified, 61 A.D.2d 147, 402 N.Y.S.2d 655 (4th Dep't), af'd, 44 N.Y.2d
831, 378 N.E.2d 115, 406 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1978).
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nificant fiscal consequences for governmental operations. When
contrasted with welfare cases, they suggest an explanation for judicial fidelity to the Jones doctrine. The unarticulated concern in
the welfare decisions is not simply a reluctance to impose classwide
relief that may have severe fiscal impact; it is a reluctance to direct
such relief on behalf of welfare recipients.
The New York courts are making both a procedural determi72
nation and a judgment about the very nature of welfare benefits.
Whether or not intended, the decisions suggest that welfare is a
gratuity 173 subject to state legislative or administrative whim, and
that the rights of welfare recipients need not be protected in the
same fashion as traditional property interests.17 4 Negative conclu172. Cf. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976). Professor Mashaw argues that administrative procedures not
only perform a utilitarian function ensuring the accuracy of decisions, but also foster
dignity and equality values. He suggests that a decision denying social security benefits,
for example, is "a judgment of considerable social significance, and one that the claimant

should rightly perceive as having a substantial moral content." Id. at 51. See also L. TRBE,
supra note 82, at 502-03 (due process requirements are valued for both their intrinsic and
instrumental character).
173. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) with Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971). In Goldberg, the Court described welfare as "more like 'property' than a
'gratuity.'" 397 U.S. at 262 n. 8. The Court believed that
important governmental interests are promoted by affording recipients a pretermination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the Nation's basic commitment
has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.

We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions,
has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance
system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring

within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare
guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity,
but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty

to ourselves and our Posterity."
Id. at 264-65 (footnote omitted). One year later, however, the Court opined that public
assistance is similar to "private charity." Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 319. For an analysis
of the Supreme Court's attitude toward welfare, see Brudno, Fairness and Bureaucracy:
The Demise of ProceduralDue Processfor Welfare Claimants, 25 HATNGS L.J. 813 (1974).
174. In cases involving traditional property interests, courts have readily granted
class certification under article 9. See, e.g., Vickers v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 56
A.D. 2d 62, 390 N.Y.S.2d 747 (4th Dep't 1977) (class certified in action claiming violations
of federal Truth-in-Lending Act); Guadagno v. Diamond Tours, 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392
N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (class certified in action claiming breach of contract in connection with sale of travel tours to Jamaican resort); Boulevard Gardens Tenants Action
Comm., Inc. v. Boulevard Gardens Hous. Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 98, 388 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct.
1976) (class certified in action claiming illegal imposition of air conditioning charge).
Moreover, while the Jones rationale purportedly applies to cases involving any governmental operation, see note 6 supra, it has been enforced more consistently in lawsuits
against welfare officials. In actions involving other governmental bodies, the courts have
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sions on the procedural issue fortify public attitudes that recipients
are not entitled to the same regard afforded nonrecipients, and reinforce the stigma attached to public assistance. It reconfirms the
individual recipient's own conception of herself as a suppliant,
to the extensive authority conferred on the social
obliged to submit
1 76
services agency.
In contrast to the New York courts' stance on class certification and their impression of the underlying substantive right is the
position taken by the California courts in welfare cases. Courts
there have adopted a debt theory of welfare, which was described
over thirty years ago:
The obligation to pay [public assistance becomes] a debt due from
the county to the applicant as of the date the latter was first entitled to receive the aid.... The bare fact that an applicant has by
one means or another managed to ward off starvation pending receipt of the payments to which he was previously entitled provides
no sufficient excuse for a county to refuse to make such payments.
To hold otherwise would... provide a money-saving device for the
of those of our citizenry least able to bear
counties at the expense
77
the burden thereof.
Having concluded that public assistance is a debt owed by the public to the recipient, California courts have readily awarded retroactive benefits,' 7 attorneys' fees,179 and prejudgment interest on the

amount of the wrongfully-withheld grant.8 0 Consistent with the
view of welfare as an entitlement deserving judicial protection, 81
shown an increasing willingness to apply article 9 criteria on a case-by-case basis, rather
than automatically denying certification. See, e.g., Knapp v. Michaux, 55 A.D. 2d 1025,

1026, 391 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (4th Dep't 1977); Ammon v. Suffolk County, 90 Misc. 2d 871,
396 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
175. See generally J. FEAGIN, SUBORmDNAING THE POOR: WELFARE AND AMERICAN BELrEFS (1975); Handler 8, Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Kulger, Invisible Woman? Role-Perception in Welfare Litigation, 2 BIACK L.J. 257 (1972).
176. Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54
CALIF. L. RFV. 370, 384 (1966).
177. Board of Soc. Welfare v. Los Angeles County, 27 Cal. 2d 81, 86, 162 P.2d 630,
633 (1945); accord, Canfield v. Prod, 67 Cal. App. 3d 722, 137 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1977); Rogers
v. Detrich, 58 Cal. App. 3d 90, 128 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1976).
178. E.g., Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal. 3d 671, 552 P.2d 749, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1976);
Rogers v. Detrich, 58 Cal. App. 3d 90, 128 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1976); Hypolite v. Carleson, 52
Cal. App. 3d 566, 125 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1975); Mooney v. Pickett, 26 Cal. App 3d 431, 102
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1972).
179. E.g., Hypolite v. Carleson, 52 Cal. App. 8d 566, 586, 125 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223
(1975).
180. E.g., Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal. 3d 671, 552 P.2d 749, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1976).
181. But see Griffeth v. Detrich, 448 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (S.D. Cal. 1978) (applicants
for general relief do not have a "'property interest' or 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to
the desired aid.").
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the courts have held that class certification is proper in welfare
cases, and that classwide relief is warranted."8 2 It is especially interesting to note that the courts have reached this determination despite the state's retention of the Field Code version of the class
action rule. 18 3 New York has rejected that form of the class rule as
too restrictive and unresponsive to contemporary litigation
models, 4 yet, in welfare cases the courts apply the modern article
9 provisions much more narrowly than California courts apply the
older Field Code provision. This disparate treatment of class certification results from dissimilar conceptions of the underlying
values sought to be protected by welfare litigation.8 5
It is perhaps futile to attempt to ascertain the actual reason
for New York judicial denial of class action designation in welfare
cases. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the true motives
of the judges. These motives are, however, somewhat irrelevant.
The significant fact is that the opinions and their misplaced reliance on stare decisis create the impression that the articulated
reason for denying class certification is simply a veil concealing an
unarticulated hostility to welfare claims.
Courts in New York, as elsewhere, should recognize that the
class action rule has intrinsic, as well as instrumental, value in welfare litigation. A decision that welfare litigants constitute a legitimate group within the class action provisions is a statement about
public assistance and recipients of public aid. It is a pronouncement
that such individuals are entitled to the "equal concern and respect" 188 afforded those litigants asserting other property interests.
And that declaration has significance well beyond the functional
benefits of the class procedure.
182. See, e.g., Rogers v. Detrich, 58 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 128 Cal. Rptr. 261, 269
(1976); Hypolite v. Carleson, 52 Cal. App. 3d 566, 577-81, 125 Cal. Rptr. 221, 227-30

(1975).
183. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
184. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
185. The New York Court of Appeals recently held that article 17 of the New York
State Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the state legislature to aid the needy,
and that such aid "was deemed to be a fundamental part of the social contract." Tucker
v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (1977). Subsequently,
the court narrowed its interpretation of article 17 and concluded that the principle enunciated in Tucker relates only "to questions of impermissible exclusion of the needy from
eligibility for benefits, not to%the absolute sufficiency of the benefits distributed to each
eligible recipient." Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 449, 373 N.E.2d 238, 244, 402 N.Y.S.2d
342, 349 (1977).
186. R. DWORmN, TAxING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977). Professor Dworkin uses the
phrase "equal concern and respect" in describing the concept of equality.
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CONCLUSION

It is not suggested here that all welfare cases be certified as
class actions. Rather the proposal is more modest-welfare litigants
should be given the same opportunity to use the class action procedure as provided other litigants. A class action motion in a welfare case, as in any lawsuit, should be decided on the basis of the
criteria described in the class action statute, not on the basis of an
unsupported assumption that stare decisis principles will protect
unnamed parties.87 To continue to hold otherwise prevents vindication of substantive welfare rights and, equally disturbing,
perpetuates distinctions between welfare recipients and those individuals not compelled to rely directly Is on the public for subsistence.
While the immediate proposal is moderate, the ultimate concern is a much more fundamental concern for the concept of
"procedural justice." Cappelletti and Garth have recently described that concept:
In the context of our formal courts and procedures, "justice" has
essentially meant the application of the correct rules of law to the
true facts of the case. This concept of justice was the standard by
which procedures were measured. The new attitude toward procedural justice reflects what Professor Adolf Homburger has called
"a radical change in the hierarchy of values served by civil procedure"; the paramount concern is increasingly with "social justice," i.e., with finding procedures that are conductive to the pursuit
and protection of the rights of ordinary people.1so

The class action rule is precisely the kind of procedural device that
contributes to the pursuit and protection of substantive welfare

rights. It is a mechanism that promotes procedural justice for the
poor.
187. In 1977, State Assemblyman Mark Siegel and State Senator Joseph Pisani introduced bills (A. 7018 and S. 4360, respectively) that would amend Section 901 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules by adding the following subsection: "It shall not be grounds for
denial of class relief that the action or proceeding in which such relief is requested is
against a governmental body or officer." Enactment of such legislation would provide a
welcome termination of the Jones doctrine. The courts, however, need not await legislative action. The exemption of welfare cases from article 9 was judicially created, and may
be judicially abrogated. Cf. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 600, 805
A.2d 877, 885 (1973) (courts have not only the power but the duty to abolish a judicially
imposed doctrine that is unsound and unjust).
188. Many of those individuals who do not rely directly on welfare are nevertheless
beneficiaries of government aid. See Reich, supra note 166.
189. Cappelletti g- Garth, supra note 141, at 240-41 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).

